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Abstract
This paper studies the link between group-specific consumption growth and volatil-
ity within a framework of heterogeneous agents, under the assumption of a consumption
externality. Household preferences are related to the volatility through asset holding de-
cisions: volatility decreases with groups’ degree of patience, and increases with household
eagerness to keep up with the group average. Moreover, consumption growth is expected
to relate positively to the volatility. This last hypothesis is tested using household data
imputed from GSOEP and the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS), where
a U-shaped relationship is found for the nondurable consumption. Moreover, examin-
ing the growth-inequality relationship using EVS data alone shows that it is positive for
nondurable and negative for durable consumption.
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1 Introduction
Consumption inequality is a direct measure for the well-being of population, while consump-
tion growth and volatility are alternative welfare measures at higher orders. Various socio-
economic groups, defined by age, household size, occupation and etc., have diverse preferences
and are subject to heterogeneous shocks. The modification of the trade-off between consump-
tion/saving differs, which further affects consumption fluctuations and the growth trend to
different extent. Consequently, not only consumption pattern but also the growth and fluc-
tuation are divergent across groups. Groups subject to large shocks and lacking smoothing
possibility appear to have on average lower growth and higher fluctuations, indicating that
they are at disadvantageous welfare positions. For example, income and consumption growth
inequality for different age groups are very different (Figure 1). As younger groups have
higher consumption growth, their consumption volatility is also higher.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold: 1) providing a theoretical framework of
heterogeneous agents with consumption externality in order to examine the link between
group-specific consumption growth and volatility, 2) finding empirical evidence on the afore-
mentioned relationship using matched household data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) and the German Income and Expenditure Survey (Einkommens- und Ver-
brauchsstichprobe, or EVS in later text), and 3) examining the empirical relationship between
growth and within-group inequality.
Aiming at examining the relation between consumption growth and volatility, I use a
framework stemming from the literature studying income shocks and consumption inequality.
Complete market hypothesis is not preferred here for two reasons. First, the perfect insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks implied by the complete market theory is rejected by plenty
empirical evidence (Attanasio and Davis, 1996, Attanasio and Pavoni, 2007). Moreover, the
complete market assumption, often resembled by a complete set of Arrow-Debreu security for
each state, suggest that, given identical preferences, there should be no consumption mobility
because everyone is insured similarly. This, however, is also strongly rejected by the data
(Fisher and Johnson, 2006, Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2006). According to Lucas (1992), “if
the children of Noah had been able and willing to pool risks, Arrow-Debreu style, among
themselves and their descendants, then the vast inequality we see today, within and across
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societies, would not exist.”
On the contrast, incomplete markets models are generally adopted to study the diverse
evolution of income and consumption inequality (Blundell and Preston, 1998, Blundell, Pista-
ferri and Preston, 2008). Be the reason of market incompleteness limited enforcement of
contracts (Kru¨ger and Perri, 2005) or private information problems (Attanasio and Pavoni,
2007), risk-sharing is not perfect but sufficient. In fact, a model with one single asset and
heterogeneous household preferences can offer partial but relatively good insurance against
income shocks (Krusell and Smith, 1998), whereas under certain assumptions it can match
the real-world wealth distribution relatively well. More discussion and literature review on
incomplete markets model can be found in Heathcote et al. (2009). For simplicity while
not losing generosity, the theoretical framework of the current paper is reduced to a “stan-
dard incomplete market” model in an endowment economy, where a large number of agents
draw idiosyncratic realizations of endowment, and make independent choices for consump-
tion and asset holding. Their choices determine, in aggregate, the total amount of capital for
production and the equilibrium rental rate for capital.
Households from various socio-economic groups differ in patience and attitude towards
their reference, i.e. the group average consumption. This is different from the neoclas-
sical economic reasoning, which is typically based on self-interest hypothesis, i.e., people
are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. Indeed, both absolute and rela-
tive consumption matter for households in the current model, whereas the idea of relative
consumption associates with conceptual consumption (Ariely and Norton, 2009) and “social
preferences”(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), and can go back to Veblen’s (1899) discussion of
conspicuous consumption and Duesenberry’s Relative Income Hypothesis (1949).
Acknowledging consumption growth inequality as a result of income uncertainties (per-
manent and transitory) and consumption innovation, I approximate the Euler equation of
heterogeneous households in general equilibrium to study the link between two key features
of consumption evolution: growth and volatility. Comparative statics show that volatility
decreases with groups’ degree of patience, and increases with household eagerness to keep up
with the group average. The strength of the effects vary over the business cycle. Moreover,
the correlation between the group average growth and volatility indicated by the model is pos-
itive once parameters take consensus values. Due to data limitation, only the last proposition
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is able to be examined empirically for distinct socio-economics groups.
The grouping method forming the heterogeneous preferences, indeed, is crucial for study-
ing the link between growth and volatility of the economy. Cross-country estimates using
aggregate data and cross-sector studies using sector level data can generate opposite results.
For example, in the case of output growth, as Ramey and Ramey (1995) find higher volatility
accompanied by lower growth in two samples of countries, Imbs (2007) re-examines the issue
at sector level and presents evidence of positive correlation.
The procedure taken in this paper is adjusted to the availability and structure of the data.
Studies on consumption inequality in Germany are less prevalent than on income inequality
due to the limited availability of survey data. Recently, Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, Kru¨ger and Sommer
(FSKS, 2010) look into both income and consumption inequality in Germany. They document
an upward inequality trends of wage income after the reunification, and finds a more modest
rise of consumption inequality over the same period1. The analysis of the current paper
focuses on consumption growth and volatility, and complements a number of studies that use
micro data to document the evolution of income or wage inequality in Germany in the last
25 years (among others, Biewen, 2000, Dustmann, Ludsteck and Scho¨nberg, 2007).
Two data sets are under investigation, the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS)
and an imputed sample from EVS and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). There
are two approaches to impute consumption: one by using the estimated coefficients, and the
other through matching cells in EVS and GSOEP. The imputed consumption is used to con-
struct consumption growth, volatility and within-group variance. The resulting consumption
measure embodies the well-documented consumption and income information in EVS and
the panel structure in GSOEP.
Although it is impossible to identify the direction of households’ attitude towards peers’
well-being with the current data, the finding of Knies’ (2010) using income and life satisfaction
1Evidences on the trend of consumption inequality are mixed for other developed countries. Blundell and
Preston (1998) document substantial differences in inequality growth over the 1980s across birth cohorts in
the UK, while Crossley and Pendakur (2002) notice that overall consumption inequality in Canada has fallen
slightly over the period 1969 to 1999. Barrett et al. (2000) find much lower inequality in consumption than
in income in Australia. The disjuncture between income and consumption inequality, also found in the US
over the 1980s, can be explained by changes in the persistence of income shocks (Blundell at al. 2008) or by
predictable income shocks (Primiceri and van Rens, 2009).
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data appears to support the “relative income” hypothesis in West Germany. The empirical
focus of the current paper lies in identifying the correlation between growth and volatility,
which is found positive and significant in fixed-effect estimates using EVS data. More complex
nonlinear relationship is found when the data sets are matched so as to explore the panel
structure. Moreover, group growth also appears to be positively linked to within-group
variances, implying higher inequality as the welfare cost for faster growing groups regardless
of the driving factors of growth. Household size, age and nationality of the household head
turn out to be significantly relevant to individual consumption growth and volatility, whereas
community size and heads’ occupation are only related to volatility. Heads’ education appears
irrelevant. Figure 1 shows in detail how strong the age effect is not only in growth, but also
in volatility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model and
derives four propositions; Section 3 introduces the data and specifies the grouping strategy; in
Section 4 proposition four is tested and the estimate results are discussed; Section 5 concludes.
2 Consumption Growth and Volatility
2.1 Social Interaction and Relative Consumption
Among the extensions added to the incomplete market setup in the asset pricing literature,
one special aspect is to include relative consumption into household utility as a consumption
externality.
Psychological and economic studies often show that both absolute and relative consump-
tion matter for individual well-being and behavior (see, e.g. Duesenberry, 1949, Diener et
al. 1999, Luttmer, 2005). Individuals’ satisfaction derived from being better than their peers
can be interpreted as envy, inequity aversion, relative deprivation, or a human propensity
to judge one’s achievement relative to that of others. The “others” here are the reference
groups of actors, a concept brought about in social psychology early in the 1940s (Hyman,
1942). Depending on the situation, they can be coworkers, relatives, neighbors, or mem-
bers of clubs and organizations. Moreover, they can also be people who are geographically
away and do not interact with the actor physically. According to Shibutani (1955), reference
groups can be: (1) those serve as comparison points, (2) those to which men aspire, and (3)
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those sharing the same perspectives with the individuals. The last category requires common
communication channels, each of which gives rise to a separate world, or, a socioeconomic
group. The social worlds can be ethnic minorities, the social elite, medicine association,
theater audience, readers of certain periodicals, or, in today’s context, groups on facebook.
In a word, these associative reference groups realistically represent the individuals’ current
equals or near-equals, i.e. they are from the same socioeconomic background, which is the
definition for groups in the current paper.
While others’ income can hardly be detected, households can relatively easily observe
the life styles and infer the consumption levels of others with similar socio-economic status.
Their optimal security holding will adapt accordingly and their consumption smoothing path
is different from an externality-free world. As result, their evaluation of others’ consumptions
affects the group consumption growth inequality. The direction of this effect depends on
how exactly households react to their peers’ well-being (whether they are “altruistic” or
meant to “keep up with the Joneses”). Alternatively, this reaction can be interpreted as
individuals’ life satisfaction upon the change of their peers’ income. While such attitude can
be barely identified in empirical data, happiness is often used as proxy to capture individual’s
utility. Studies based on developed countries find that subjective welfare depends positively
on one’s own consumption but negatively on the average consumption level of others nearby
(Easterlin, 2001, Blanchflower et al., 2004, Luttmer, 2005). Knies (2010) finds comparable
evidence in West Germany where West Germans are significantly unhappier with their lives if
their neighbors are getting richer, implying an urge of the West German households to avoid
being lagging back from their neighbors, or alternatively, the urge to keep up. This effect
is slightly more marked in neighborhoods with presumably more social interactions, so that
households may be able to assess more accurately the change of their neighbors’ financial
position. On the opposite, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) find that in Napel, households
in isolated areas care more about what their neighbors consume. Their reasoning is that
in isolated communities neighbors can more accurately approximate the relevant reference
group than in more mobile urban communities. These observations require economic models
to take social environment into account, whose effects are heterogeneous according to agents’
socio-economic background.
The preference on relative consumption can be regarded as a special form of physical con-
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sumption or a conceptual consumption besides the physical consumption. Long discussed by
sociologists and anthropologists in the field of consumer behavior, it is summarized in Ariely
and Norton (2009) that “physical consumption is used not just to satisfy basic needs but
also to signal to ourselves and others our beliefs, attitudes, and social identities”. Therefore
conceptual consumption strongly influences physical consumption, and the possession of a
BMW convertible is often only partly due to the need for transport. The concept consumed
is the (relative) social status, which dates back to Veblen’s (1899) discussion of conspicuous
consumption and Duesenberry’s Relative Income Hypothesis (1949), and accords with the
“social preferences” in Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).
As a special type of consumption externalities, relative consumptions serves as powerful
non-pecuniary motives. The model setup of the current paper borrows the spirit of Gal´ı(1994).
How this externality exactly matters for individuals can be captured in individuals’ utility
in relative well-being comparing to their reference groups, which, as stressed in sociological
literature, tends to consist of others who are similar in terms of background variables such as
age, education and household size (see, for example, Merton and Kitt, 1950, and Festinger,
1954). Household preferences are assumed to be heterogeneous accordingly. As Shibutani
(1955) emphasizes, culture, a perspective that is shared by those in a particular group, may
also constitute the frame of the reference and matter for the direction of there preference.
This is indeed documented in Knies (2010), where compared to West Germans’ becoming
unhappier on their neighbors’ increasing wealth, East Germans’ life satisfaction positively,
though insignificantly, correlates with neighborhoods’ income.
As previous sociologists and psychologists emphasize the role of positional goods (a similar
concept to aforementioned conspicuous consumption) in relative consumption, it was assumed
that higher income group care more about it since a larger part of their consumption composes
of positional goods. However, relative consumption is also found to be important for vacation
and insurance, which are typically seen as non-positional goods (Alpizar et al. 2005). Besides,
evidence shows that poorer groups care no less about the relative consumption than their
richer counterparts do (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008). It seems that the effect of relative
consumption prevails over the economy.
What to keep up with are the associative references, or, the group mean. In a world of
uncertainty, current group mean serves as the local norm for households to set realistic goals,
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which is the third type of reference summarized by Shibutani (1955). As is mentioned above,
the incentive to keep up can be interpreted as envy, inequity aversion, relative deprivation,
or a human propensity to judge one’s achievement relative to that of others. Take inequity
aversion for instance, inequity averse persons want to achieve an equitable distribution of
material resources, i.e. they want to neither surpass nor fall behind others in the reference
groups, but keeping up with those above them and staying the same with those below them.
Therefore, the group mean becomes their benchmark. This setup is slightly different from the
case when individuals would like to emulate the top households of the group, which coincides
with the “aspiring” case in Shibutani’s (1955) definition and would cause more deviation
from an externality-free economy.
There is a subtle difference if agents take past or current average consumption as bench-
mark. The former, which is a variation of the habit formation setup, is the case of “catching
up with the Joneses” (Mehra and Prescott, 1985, Abel, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999)
and the latter “keeping up with the Joneses” (Gal´ı, 1994). While the former involves the
interdependence between the agents’ past, present and future well-being, the latter setup
emphasizes contemporaneous trade-offs and generates simpler results2. Since the true task
is to study contemporaneous consumption distribution in a cross-sectional panel setting, the
current paper imposes “keeping up with the Joneses” assumption so as to avoid more complex
intertemporal considerations.
2.2 A Heterogeneous Agent Model
The setup follows Gal´ı (1994) where households regard contemporary group average con-
sumption as an external benchmark (“keeping up with the Joneses”). While Gal´ı’s (1994)
model describes the homogeneous households in the whole economy, the current paper takes
the perspective of each group, and the “keeping up” mechanism bounds the agents within the
group. The heterogeneity of agents between groups is captured as the different preferences,
namely patience and attitude toward the benchmark. Using a heterogeneous agent model
2In fact, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) discusses optimal tax policies using these two differentiated cases and
finds procyclical taxes for the former and a flat tax rate for the latter to be optimal. Guo (2003) elaborates
the latter case by adding capital accumulation and imperfect competition in the goods market and finds a
similar result.
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enables the contemporaneous examination of consumption growth inequality within group,
while still allowing for comparison in the time dimension and/or group-to-group dimension.
There is a continuum of households of measure 1 in this economy. Households belong to
different groups i ∈ {1, ...M}, where the level of patience (βi) and the attitude towards group
average consumption (κi) differ. These differences capture the socio-economic heterogeneity
in the population. In the empirical part of the paper later groups are defined according to
household size, community size, household heads’ nationality, age, education level and job
type. One can also intuitively interpret a group as a highly similar neighborhood. pi denotes
the number of households in each group. Households belong to certain groups because of
the aforementioned features but are still subject to small idiosyncratic shocks, either from
income or consumption innovation. Although households in a given group do not observe the
exact income of other group members, they can observe their consumption patterns. If they
would like to be identical with the others in a similar socio-economic class, it is the case of
“keeping up with the Joneses”. Otherwise, if they also benefit when others are doing well,
we have “altruistic” households. I label the result of this additional externality a group effect
on household consumption decisions.
Households receive idiosyncratic endowment every period3. One household in group i has
a stochastic endowment process {ΥtΥi,tyt}, where Υt and Υi,t are the stochastic economy-
wide and group-specific income endowment respectively, and {yt} is the idiosyncratic com-
ponent for each household in the economy. This implies that, within one group, households’
endowments share a common group-specific element while differing in being subject to id-
iosyncratic shocks in each period. {yt} follows a Markov process with initial probability
distribution Π0 (·) and transition probabilities pit (y′|y). yt = (y0, y1...yt) captures the history
of endowment shocks, such that the compound probability of a history yt given an initial
endowment y0 is pit
(
yt|y0
)
= pit−1 (yt|yt−1)pit−2 (yt−1|yt−2) ...pi0 (y1|y0) . At date t households
are distinguished jointly by their group i, their initial asset holdings αij,t, and their initial
endowment shock yt. Intertemporally, households transfer their resources by trading one
single asset economy wide. The borrowing, however, is subject to a household-specific debt
limit Aij,t
(
Υt,Υi,t, y
t
)
, i.e., a pre-specified credit line is contingent on the economy, group
3This is a simplified version of a model with stochastic labor endowment, such as in Kru¨ger and Perri
(2006). Inclusion of labor supply in the current model is possible but not crucial.
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and household specific endowment histories up to period t.
For simplicity it is assumed that households have zero mobility across groups at a point
in time. The reason is two-fold. On the one hand, GSOEP data shows that mobility is not
the dominant issue, since more than half of the households in the samples (56.8%) between
1984 and 2005 have never changed their groups, while among the group switchers over half
of them (51.8%) have changed only once, among which over half happened due to aging.
In a word, these heterogeneous households appeared to stay relatively persistently in their
group. On the other hand, the later use of panel data is to examine consumption growth in
sequential years, where cross-sectional comparison is the final aim.
Define Cij,t as the time t consumption of the jth household in ith group, with group
average consumption Xi,t. Since the purpose of this paper is on the consumption dynamics,
the model is reduced to an endowment economy and the household problem is boiled down
to consumption and asset holding decisions. With a group-specific discount factor βi, which
implies that groups are different in patience, a household from group i of type (Υt,Υi,t, yt)
chooses a consumption stream and asset holding plans for one single asset to solve the fol-
lowing maximization problem:
max
{Cij,t}∞t=0,{αij,t+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βti [u (Cij,t, Xi,t)]
subject to
Cij,t + qt ∗ αij,t+1 ≤ ΥtΥi,tyt + αij,t, (1)
One unit asset is priced qt in period t and pays one unit of consumption good in period
t+ 1. In econometric studies on consumption, household’s consumption Cij,t are sometimes
decomposed of a principal part and an exogenous idiosyncratic shock which captures small
consumption innovation of the household (such as Blundell and Preston, 1998, and Blundell
et al., 2008). Parker and Preston’s (2005) estimate shows that such change in consumption
preference is crucial for the variance of household consumption growth. Initial asset holding
αij,0 is given and the borrowing constraints hold in order to rule out Ponzi schemes:
−αij,t+1 ≤ Aij,t (Υt,Υi,t, yt)
9
The utility function has the following isoelastic form:
u (Cij,t, Xi,t) =
C1−γij,t X
−(1−γ)κi
i,t − 1
1− γ . (2)
γ is the risk aversion parameter and is usually larger than 14. Note that in absence of
household specific idiosyncratic shock, Cij,t equals Xi,t. (2) can be rewritten as
u (Cij,t, Xi,t) =
C1−γiij,t − 1
1− γ ,
where γ − (γ − 1)κi = γi. This transformation implies that the combination of economy-
wide identical risk aversion and group-specific attitude towards consumption externality is
equivalent to a neoclassical economy with no consumption externality but heterogeneous risk
aversion. Both cases lead to the same Euler equation, though.
Group consumption serves as an external benchmark, and κi <
γ
γ−1 as the attitude of
group i households towards this benchmark can be interpreted as “how important is my
neighbors’ consumption for me”. Taking log of the core of the utility function yields:
(1− γ) lnCij,t − (1− γ)κi lnXi,t = (1− γ)
[
(1− κi) lnCij,t + κi ln Cij,t
Xi,t
]
.
Scaled by parameter κi, the household’s consumption preference is a weighted average of
the absolute and relative consumption (compared to group average). There is no restriction
on κi to be positive or negative, which allows us to examine three cases considering the group
effect in consumption:
1. When 0 < κi <
γ
γ−1 , the household would like to “keep up with the Joneses”. Average
consumption decreases the household’s utility level but increases household’s marginal utility
of an additional unit of consumption. This reflects exactly the economic implication of
“keeping up with the Joneses”, since “any given addition to his current level of consumption
becomes more valuable”5. In the later part of the paper, it will become clear that such partial
preferences, keeping up with the Joneses, could reduce contemporaneous consumption growth
4Alternatively, to elaborate elastic labor supply, the utility function could take the form
u (ct, xi,t, lt) =
c1−γiij,t x
−(1−γi)κi
i,t − 1
1− γi − χ
l1−ψt
1− ψ ,
where lt = ΥtΥi,tyt.
5Gal´ı (1994).
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inequality but drive up consumption volatility over the business cycle further from a model
without consumption externalities.
2. When κi < 0, households do not take the group mean as benchmark, but rather
gain utility once the others in the group are doing well. For philanthropists this could be
interpreted as altruism. However, a more economic intuition is that the group mean welfare
acts as “substitute” for the household’s own welfare. In the absence of government in the
current model, one can imagine the public good as good weather or air quality. Knies (2010)
interprets it in another cultural context. Comparing West and East Germany and being in
line with the result of Senik (2004, 2008), she conjectures that in East Germany this post-
transition economy, positive changes in others’ circumstances can serve as a positive signal
for possible improvements in one’s own financial situation. As a result, a positive association
is expected between neighborhood income and life satisfaction.
3. When κi = 0, the utility function is reduced to a typical self insurance version, where
agents are only concerned with their own consumption.
The resulting Euler equation is6:
qt = βiEt
[(
Cij,t+1
Cij,t
)−γ (Xi,t+1
Xi,t
)−(1−γ)κi]
.
Since all households in group i have the identical optimization problem, through aggregation,
it holds for group i in general equilibrium:
qt = βiEt
[(
Xi,t+1
Xi,t
)−γ−(1−γ)κi]
, (3)
where qt is determined by demand and supply in the financial market and is exogenous for
single households. The aggregated Euler equation (3) implies that the degree of risk aversion,
and the group-specific discount factor as well as the attitude to neighbors’ consumption
6In Abel’s (1990) model households compare themselves with the previous consumption of the group
members, so as to “catch up with the Joneses”. Households still buy one unit of risk-free bond at price qt
qt
(
xi,t
xi,t−1
)−(1−γ)κ
= βEt
[(
cij,t+1
cij,t
)−γ]
Taking logs gives the same result as above, since the growth rate of xi,t is time invariant. This picture,
however, can be totally different if consumption growth is time-variant.
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determine the group consumption growth together. Group consumption growth is slow when
households in the group are less patient (small βi) and prefer current to future consumption,
or when they put more value on their current relative position in the group (κi is positive and
increases) and would rather “keep up” consumption than buying security (a similar effect to
households’ being “impatient”).
If for most households the idiosyncratic shock yt turns out to be negative, implying a
negative income shock in the aggregate, net borrowing demand (sales of the security) increases
and ceteris paribus, the asset price qt will decrease, and the return for those households
purchasing the security increases. Needless to say, in a general equilibrium qt is also subject
to the distribution of βi, κi and γ.
2.3 Implication on Consumption Dynamics
The permanent income hypothesis states that periodical consumption is subject to lifetime
resources, instead of each period’s income. Household wealth is thus a better candidate as a
consumption constraint. However, while the change of household consumption is additionally
triggered by consumption innovations, the main shocks occurring to household consumption
are often identified as contemporaneous income shocks in the related literature7.
Another way to look at the sources of consumption growth is to track the causes in group
level and individual level. This helps to bridge the individual level and group level variables,
and approximate equation (3). The decomposition is analogous to that in a macroeconomic
study on sectoral output growth and volatility in Imbs (2007), who disentangles the origin
of sectoral output growth into three orthogonal shocks: a global, a country specific and a
residual shock. The consumption growth rate of household j in group i is therefore given by
gij,t = %ij + ηt + ηi,t + ηij,t. (4)
Household consumption growth can deviate from an average constant %ij because of three
orthogonal zero-mean, independent shocks: an economy-wide shock ηt affecting all households
7According to Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), among others, the log of income growth is subject to permanent
and transitory income shocks. Once good panel data are available on income and consumption, one can even
identify the degrees to which permanent and transitory income shocks affect the change of consumption (see
Blundell et al., 2008).
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in all groups (think about a common technology shock to the economy-wide endowment Υt
in equation (1)), a group-specific shock ηi,t which is related to the stochastic group-specific
endowment Υi,t, as well as a residual specific to household j in group i, ηij,t. This last
household specific residual contains the idiosyncratic endowment yt and the consumption
innovation shock ηt in equation (1). gij,t is thus distributed i.i.d.∼ (%ij , θ + θi,t + θij,t) where
θ = Et
[
(ηt)
2
]
, θi = Et
[
(ηi,t)
2
]
, θij = Et
[
(ηij,t)
2
]
.
The average consumption growth for group i is thus gi,t
gi,t =
1
J
∑
j
gij,t =
1
J
∑
j
%ij + ηt + ηi,t +
1
J
∑
j
ηij,t. (5)
with the mean and variance given by
Et
 1
J
∑
j
gij,t
 = 1
J
∑
j
%ij ≡ gi, (6)
Vt
 1
J
∑
j
gij,t
 = θ + θi + 1
J2
∑
j
θij,t ≡ σ2gi . (7)
The group average consumption growth rate is assumed to be stationary and (condition-
ally and unconditionally) log-normally distributed gi,t+1 ∼
(
gi, σ
2
gi
)
8. With this information
and the help of a second order Taylor approximation, equation (3) turns out to be9:
qt ≈ βi exp
[
(−γ − (1− γ)κi) gi + (−γ − (1− γ)κi)
2
2
σ2gi
]
(8)
The security price qt is determined in the general equilibrium as a product of the state
of the economy, and the aggregation of all groups’ saving and borrowing decisions, which
in turn depend on the group-specific endowment and the distribution of the idiosyncratic
income shocks. As consumption growth and its variance are also conditional on the aggregate
economic condition (business cycle properties), the following arguments are first valid for
cross-sectional comparison within one period. That is, holding qt unchanged.
A none-zero κi leads to the deviation from an externality-free case where the household
optimization problem is independent of others’ consumption behavior. This deviation could
8Once define Gi,t+1 = 1 + gi,t+1 =
xi,t+1
xi,t
, ln
xi,t+1
xi,t
= lnGi,t+1 ≈ gi,t+1.
9See Appendix I for a detailed derivation.
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be one way to mitigate the equity premium puzzle in asset pricing. Rearranging equation (8)
gives:
σ2gi = 2
[γ + (1− γ)κi] gi + ln qt − lnβi
[γ + (1− γ)κi]2
(9)
It yields a relationship between the group average consumption growth and volatility.
Note that once the group average plays no role for single households (κi = 0), the equation
is reduced to the externality-free model:
σ2gi = 2
γgi + ln qt − lnβi
γ2
> 0 (10)
Comparing these two equations tells the effect of externality. Frank (1989) argues that,
given this externality, market conditions for Pareto optimal are violated because “each per-
son’s consumption imposes negative externalities on others”. The magnitude of these external
effects is often very large because if any one person increases his consumption, he also raises
the consumption standard for others unintentionally. Consequently, the efficient outcome
based on independent decisions of self-seeking may not hold any longer. In an economy
where goods vary in the degree of being positional, there would be excessive resources de-
voted to the production and acquisition of positional goods, insufficient resources devoted to
non-positional goods (Frank, 1985a, 1985b). Moreover, agents will consume more and save
less than in an externality-free world (see more discussion in Proposition 2). For a reasonable
value of risk aversion, i.e. γ > 1 10, the following propositions hold:
Proposition 1 For a given consumption growth rate, more patient groups have smaller
volatility.
Proof: Taking partial derivatives of σ2gi in equation (9) according to group-specific discount
factor βi yields:
∂σ2gi
∂βi
= − 2
[γ + (1− γ)κi]2 βi
< 0.
The implication is straightforward. Patient households tend to have a higher propensity to
10Other than assuming the values of the key parameters, one can use maximum likelihood (MLE) to estimate
them, which will be the next step of the research. The further task of the current paper is to examine the
empirical relationship between group average consumption growth and volatility.
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save, which insures the households against income shocks in next period to a higher degree.
As result, the volatility of growth is smaller.
This proposition is well shown in the data. The empirical study in the later part of
the paper shows that consumption volatility is significantly related to age: older households
appear to have smaller volatility. One of the possible reasons of such finding lies on the link
between income growth and degree of patience. Carroll (2001) has argued that, “positive
income growth makes consumers more impatient (in the sense of wanting to spend more
than current income) because forward-looking consumers with positive income growth will
want to spend some of their higher future income today”. On the opposite, older population,
with expected lower future income growth, thus are more patient and have a weaker wish to
discount future consumption, which, consequently, leads to smaller consumption volatility.
Proposition 2 In presence of precautionary saving, volatility increases with household
eagerness to keep up.
Proof: Taking the partial derivative of σ2gi with respect to κi yields:
∂σ2gi
∂κi
=
2 (γ − 1)
[γ + (1− γ)κi]2
[
gi + 2
(ln qt − lnβi)
γ + (1− γ)κi
]
.
Using the steady state value of gi, which is derivable from equation (3), the equation
above can be written as
∂σ2gi
∂κi
=
2 (γ − 1)
[γ + (1− γ)κi]2
ln qt − lnβi
γ + (1− γ)κi . (11)
Rearranging equation (9) delivers
ln qt − lnβi = [γ + (1− γ)κi]
2
2
σ2gi − [γ + (1− γ)κi] gi. (12)
Under precautionary saving, i.e., agents attempt to ‘self-insure’ against consumption fluc-
tuations, prudent agents increase savings (here demand for the single asset) when growth is
more volatile. Greater demand of assets puts downward pressure on interest rates, and return
of the security is slightly below the discount rate of patient agents. Accordingly, security price
qt is larger than the discount factor βi, so that ln qt > lnβi. Meanwhile, because
γ
γ−1 is the
upper bound to κi, γ + (1− γ)κi > 0. Hence in equation (11), ∂σ
2
gi
∂κi
> 0.
Household preferences show a dislike of deviation from the group average. The faster the
others in your group are upgrading than you are, the larger is the “punishment” of not being
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able to keep up with them. At a high degree of such dislike (the case of “keeping up with
the Joneses” , with a positive κi approaching 1), households prefer current consumption to
security purchases, which leads to low insurance against future shock and higher volatility
in consumption growth. Following the same argument, volatility is lower in the case when
households weigh group average well-being more heavily (regarding it as a public good) or
lack the incentive to keep up.
Proposition 3 The effect of households’ eagerness to keep up on consumption volatility
is strengthened (weakened) in booms (recessions).
Proof: Recall the partial derivative
∂σ2gi
∂κi
in (11), taking derivative according to the security
price qt leads to:
∂σ2gi/∂κi
∂qt
=
2 (γ − 1)
[γ + (1− γ)κi]2
1
γ + (1− γ)κi
1
qt
.
As discussed above, γ > 1 and γ + (1− γ)κi > 0, therefore ∂σ
2
gi
/∂κi
∂qt
> 0, implying that the
effect of households’ eagerness on consumption volatility increases in security price qt.
Comparing to the first two propositions with a particular groups’ perspective, the business
cycle effects are general and apply to all groups (all κi). Because the economy-wide endow-
ment Υt is subject to a positive shock, most agents expect to experience income growth in
booms and are willing to lend out their resources (through buying more securities). Higher
demand of securities drives up the unit price qt in general equilibrium, which further inten-
sifies the effect of household preferences (degree of patience and households’ attitude toward
external benchmark). In contrast, when most agents are subject to negative income shocks
in recessions, an overwhelming borrowing wish leads to a decline of the security price and
dampens the preference effect.
Proposition 4 There is a positive relationship between growth and volatility, unless agents
have extremely high desire to “keep up with the Joneses” (κi >
γ
γ−1).
Proof: In equation (9), taking partial derivative of σ2gi with respect to gi shows
∂σ2gi
∂gi
=
2
γ + (1− γ)κi . (13)
Under condition that κi is bounded by
γ
γ−1 , there is a positive relationship between σ
2
gi and
gi, which suggests that groups with higher consumption growth also have to bear the welfare
cost of larger volatility. Nonetheless, for a large κi, i.e. when it’s extremely important for
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agents to keep up, they would short sell securities up to the liquidity constraints. By doing
so, they indirectly insure their consumption next period, achieving a small volatility at a
given consumption growth rate.
The current paper does not aim at empirically identifying the direction of households’
attitude towards group mean, whereas the “keeping up with the Joneses” hypothesis is indi-
rectly confirmed by Knies’ (2010) finding about West Germany, i.e. a negative neighborhood
income effect on individual life satisfaction. In the following Sections, the correlation between
group consumption growth and volatility (Proposition 4) is the key hypothesis to be tested.
3 Bringing the Model to the Data
The partial equilibrium derived from the theoretical model suggests a relationship between
average consumption growth and volatility for different socio-economic groups, which can be
examined cross-sectionally using micro data. Micro data with panel structure such as the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or British Family Expenditure Survey data would be
ideal for this study purpose. In a social democratic country like Germany, where conventional
measures show that inequality grows in recent years but is still lower than the Anglo-Saxon
countries, the study on consumption is rather scarce due to data limitation. An exploration
of two main micro data set on households’ income and consumption, nonetheless, can help
to reveal part of the story on consumption inequality. These are the German Income and
Expenditure Survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) and the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP).
Both EVS and GSOEP are related to Micro Census. EVS is a quota sample with volun-
tary participation to the annual Micro Census, while GSOEP is annual longitudinal survey
with stratified random samples where Micro Census serves as weighting benchmark. EVS
takes continuous bookkeeping approach to record income and consumption in detail, whereas
GSOEP household income is imputed from monthly household income on the survey month
(“screener”), major gross income components in the month of interview and the retrospective
income data for previous year. EVS recorded tax payment and deduction apart from the tax
benefit, while GSOEP estimates tax payment based on households’ account on the previous
year tax payment, and the possible tax benefit is not included. More differences between
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EVS and GSOEP are summarized in Becker et al. (2002), and can be found in Table 1.
Before entering the discussion about group consumption patterns, the crucial question
would be, how to define groups so that it makes sense. Factor analysis using principle com-
ponents is used to distill the various household characteristics into the most informative ones
in both data sets. Regressions of the consumption growth and volatility on household de-
mographics can further reveal those significantly associated characteristics (Table 9). With
variables such as federal states discarded, the variables contributing most to group the house-
holds in EVS are age, gender, and occupation of the household heads, as well as household
size, whereas the best grouping criteria for the imputed data are age, education, occupation
and nationality of household heads, and household size (see Table 6 and 7). Even though
community size does not account much for consumption difference between households, the
theoretical model implies an indirect impact of the comparison and attitude of group mem-
bers on group average consumption growth and volatility. A reasonable deduction is that
community size affects the extent to which households can observe others with similar socio-
economic backgrounds, and therefore community size is added as one grouping condition for
both EVS and GSOEP.
3.1 EVS: data and methodology
EVS is one of the major surveys containing personal and households’ income and consumption
distributions in Germany11. The Federal Statistical Office delivers a cross sectional survey
every five years starting from the early 1960s. Until 2008 there are surveys in 1962/1963,
1969, 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988 for West Germany, and thereafter extended to East Germany
in 1993, 1998 and 2003. The purpose of bringing in the EVS is to use its information on the
consumption/income ratio on GSOEP’s panel environment. Therefore I choose the public-use
micro data sets from 1983 until 2003.
The EVS data has several advantages. Besides the rich information on consumption and
income it contains, it includes a large number of households (defined as consumer units),
11EVS is not a random sample but a quota sample with voluntary participation. However, it takes as
benchmark for recruiting participants the annual Current Population Survey of Germany (Mikrozensus), which
is a mandated random survey of large size. Consequently, the household net income brackets in the EVS are
defined identically to those in the Mikrozensus.
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and even more observations when individuals are concerned. While individual samples are
comparatively easy to be extracted from the household observations, they contain dependent
employees, self-employed, unemployed as well as citizens who are out of labor force. This
large variety of occupational status enriches the objects of the study to the general population
and makes it possible to examine consumption and welfare effects over time.
As Cutler and Katz (1991) takes a “top-down” approach to construct nondurable con-
sumption out of total expenditure, data structure in EVS allows for constructing nondurable,
durable and total consumption (the sum of nondurable, durable consumption plus rent) in
a “bottom-up” manner. In all, this paper takes the same point as Cutler and Katz (1991)
to exclude housing costs, vehicle purchases, spending on major appliances, insurance premia
and expenditures for financial services from nondurable consumption. Specifically, I construct
nondurable consumption of households using the existing detailed account on Classification
of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP), in line with Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, Kru¨ger and
Sommer (2010). What are included in the nondurable consumption are expenditures for food,
clothes, energy, health, body care, travel, communication, education, rent, and household ser-
vices, while part of leisure and miscellaneous also belong to nondurables. Exceptions such as
electric appliances, photo camera, sport equipment or other high-valued durable goods join
furniture, car repairs, garage rental fee, and large electric device maintenance to be counted
as durable consumption. Summing up the durable, nondurable consumption as well as the
rent, yields the total consumption. One should note that the every-five-year data collection
in EVS may cause little bias to nondurable consumption due to its smooth feature. However,
since durable consumption is much more sensitive to business cycle than the nondurbales and
may vary much from year to year (Mankiw, 1985), the reported durable consumption in EVS
sample years may not be representative over the study years. The imputation of durable
consumption is thus less justified than the nondurables. This may be one of the reasons
why the later estimations concerning the imputed data are significant for nondurables but
insignificant for durable consumption (Table 15).
The groups are defined by households characteristics available for all waves, i.e. household
size, age of household head, occupation of household head, community size and the gender of
household head. The information on the nationality of household head only starts from 1988
and the education (professional training) level starts from 1993, therefore they are not used
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for dividing the groups. The exact grouping criteria is summarized in Table 6.
Though there is no direct micro information on households’ consumption growth, we can
use difference of group average log consumption to approximate the average group consump-
tion growth, because
1
J
∑
j
gij,t ≈ 1
J
∑
j
(cij,t − cij,t−1) = 1
J
∑
j
cij,t − 1
J
∑
j
cij,t−1 = ci,t − ci,t−1
where the lower case c is the log of consumption. The econometric framework would be:
ci,t − ci,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
gi,t
= α0 + α1SDt (4ci,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σi,t
+X ′i,tα2 + µi + δt + i,t (14)
where SDt (4ci,t) denotes the standard deviation of consumption growth from mean12, and
α1 and α2 are vectors of coefficients assumed common across groups. µi captures the time-
invariant group characteristics which are used to group the samples (fixed effect), δt is a
time dummy and the residual i,t represents the deviation of growth from its predicted value.
Xi,t is a vector of controls for the group, a unique combination of which determines the
group-specific parameters βi and κi in the theoretical model.
Meanwhile, the data allows for exploring the relationship between consumption growth
and the change of within-group inequality. In the following regression equation, the main
difference from (14) is the ∆SDt (ci,t) term, representing the change of within-group standard
deviation across household observations at time t along the group mean consumption growth.
This serves as an additional examination of the welfare effect of the consumption growth.
ci,t − ci,t−1 = α0 + α1∆SDt (ci,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆i
+X ′i,tα2 + µi + δt + i,t (15)
Table 8 provides some summary statistics for EVS on the cross-section and over time
of gi, σi and ∆i. The size of all groups over time varies between 1 and 4864, with 210.7
as mean and 53 as median, showing a large variation between the groups. Unconditional
correlation between group growth and its standard deviation for each time period is negative
while that between group growth and change in within-group standard deviation is positive.
These correlations between aggregated variables can not tell much since no group or time
effect is taken into consideration.
12Instead of variance, using standard deviation as control variable helps to interpret the result of the point
estimation as percentage to percentage change.
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The EVS, nonetheless, can only provide an approximation of the consumption growth due
to lack of panel structure. Since only limited household characteristics are available, sampled
households in one group in different time period can bear large consumption variation due
to unobservable features, implying a time-variant household specific residual (θij) and thus
a varying σ2gi in equation (7). Moreover, the inclusion of various households in every wave
naturally increases the dispersion of the residuals, suggesting an overestimation of the σ2gi and
thus σi,t in (14). Additionally, since the EVS survey was carried out every five years, possibly
each wave is at a similar time point of the business cycle, say, in the extreme case, all above
or all below the long run trend of output. The direct result, comparing to a panel-structured
study over the years, would be an underestimation of the variation of θ. The impact on θi is
more difficult to tell, which depends on the distribution of the group-specific shocks. In all,
the use of EVS data can only provide a rough picture.
3.2 Imputation with GSOEP
An alternative strategy is to borrow the panel structure from the GSOEP and to match
the two data sets so that household consumption growth can be derived. Starting from
1984, GSOEP data is based on household interviews, and contains crucial questions on living
and income. The sample used in this paper includes all West German from 1984, whereas
immigrants households are added starting in 1995. Considering the lower end of the income
distribution, both EVS and GSOEP do not cover homeless households, while GSOEP covers
a bit better of the social benefits recipient households. From 2002 on GSOEP include a
subsample of high income households whose monthly income exceeds 4,500 euro. But because
EVS does not include high income household, I exclude these high income household samples
in GSOEP for year 2002 and 2003.
GSOEP does not offer much information on consumption, and it is also unfeasible to con-
struct consumption from the available information on financial inflows and outflows because
there is little information on yearly credit or any other form of borrowing the households have
taken. The forcible imputation of consumption would bear large bias, which is especially se-
rious for low-income households who compose of the fat left tail of the imputed consumption
distribution.
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Serving as basis for calculating group-specific consumption growth and volatility, house-
hold consumption can be imputed in two ways from EVS and GSOEP. The first method
follows Skinner (1987) and Fisher and Johnson (2006), and involves imputing consumption
using EVS information on household consumption, net income, and various household demo-
graphics for the available six waves, namely 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003. It shows
that,
ci,t = α0 + α1 ∗ inc+X ′i,tα2 + i,t (16)
Interpolating the estimated coefficients for the between years and applying the results to
the comparable13 GSOEP samples (multiplying the household net income and demographics
with respective coefficients) yield the imputed household consumption.
Table 2 compares mean and median household income and consumption in EVS and the
imputed data, where the imputed consumption appears to be lower than the EVS level, and
the imputation basis, net income, is substantially lower in GSOEP than in the EVS. This
observation is in line with Becker et al. (2002). The reasoning is many fold: 1) GSOEP
covers slightly more social benefits recipient households and many more households with for-
eign heads. 2) Compared to EVS’ detailed recorded income and expenditure in diary, income
information in GSOEP is an imputation of current month income and a rough estimation of
income from previous year, therefore GSOEP income is highly possibly subject to underes-
timation. 3) Concerning the tax issue, GSOEP tax estimates based on households’ account
on the previous year tax payment exclude the possible tax benefit, and therefore possibly
GSOEP tax payment is overestimated and household net income is underestimated. 4) Con-
cerning the demographics of the households in the overlapping sample years (1988, 1993,
1998 and 2003), the EVS and GSOEP data bear strong similarities in most characteristics,
except the occupation distribution of the household heads. EVS includes a much higher share
of civil servants and the dependently employed, while the GSOEP samples include a larger
portion of self-employed, workers and the unemployed/inactive ones (Table 3).
This result is similar for the second imputation method, whose focus is on the consump-
tion/income ratio of each specific group in five waves (1983-2003). Small cells are formed
13Households in EVS and GSOEP with the same demographics are compared, and households with insuffi-
cient information are not included in the matching process.
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according to common households’ characteristics in the EVS and GSOEP, including the resid-
ing federate state, community size, households’ type, the age and the occupation of household
head14. Average consumption/income ratios are calculated for EVS for available waves and
linear interpolation helps to fill in the gaps between the waves. Needless to say, in this data
matching process, the more precise are the criteria, the smaller the cells are, and the better
the match. This ideal match would be that each single household in EVS can be matched
to its GSOEP counterpart, which is, however, impossible given the heterogeneity of the two
data sets. Aggregation of the consumption/income ratio for households sharing the same
characteristics results in less variance among the households when consumption growth is
derived in GSOEP, and reduces θij due to elimination of the household specific shocks. Con-
sequently, volatility of the group consumption growth across time would be underestimated.
Such limitation requires that the results relating to the imputed data should be very carefully
interpreted. For the data matching purpose, I choose a relatively detailed definition of the
group (Table 4), which altogether form 43,200 cells.
Interpolating this ratio between the observation years using a year trend and applying the
estimated propensities to those GSOEP households in the same cells, one can impute the con-
sumption for GSOEP samples between 1984 and 2003 and further calculate the corresponding
consumption growth rate. As a result, the imputed consumption growth rate would both re-
flect consumption, income information in the EVS and pick up the income and time structure
in the GSOEP. Table 5 reports the average consumption / income ratios of all groups in each
wave, where the consumption is either nondurable, durable or total, and income is the net
household income. Over the waves, nondurable consumption is slightly less than half of the
net income, and durable consumption varies between 13.4%−17.4% of the income, indicating
that nondurable consumption is dominant and about three times of durable consumption.
This is reasonable in the sense that durable goods consumption, such as the purchase of TV
sets and cars, is much less frequent than the nondurable consumption. Therefore reported
durable consumption for the EVS sample years is less representative than the nondurables.
Examining the ranks of the groups in various consumption definition displays that, compared
to the durable consumption, groups’ positions in nondurable consumption distribution resem-
14Some other household characteristics such as education level or years are available either in the GSOEP
or in the EVS but not simultaneously, thus they can not be used to construct the cells.
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ble their positions in total consumption to a greater extent15. Consequently, the behavior
and properties of total consumption is more similar to the nondurable consumption.
Both imputation methods have pros and cons. In all, because the estimated and imputed
coefficients in first method are average of all EVS households in each wave, the heterogene-
ity in the imputed GSOEP consumption is even more underrepresented than in the second
method. Therefore, in the following I will report consumption growth and volatility based
on imputed consumption with the second method.
Net income and nondurable consumption16 in the EVS are used to calculate the ratio,
which can be understood as the average propensity to consume. As nondurable consumption
is calculated as above, net income is defined as the household gross income17 net of health
insurance, pension insurance, unemployment insurance, various income tax, church tax as
well as other social contribution.
Complementary to the EVS data, the GSOEP survey data include important information
on the household members’ education level both in schooling years and according to the
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-1997). Moreover, occupation
profiles are also recorded in detail according to the Erikson Goldthorpe Classification (EGP)
and the occupational position (Stellung im Beruf, coded by Statistisches Bundesamt). I use
the ISCED18 and EGP19 to be in line with the related literature when grouping the samples,
even though an alternative estimation using schooling years and occupational position does
not show a significant difference. A household is counted as higher educated if one has at least
post-secondary non-tertiary education, or lower educated otherwise. At last, I use the EGP
15In about 70% of the cases, group rank in total consumption is closer to its rank in nondurable consumption
than that in durable consumption.
16The inclusion of durable goods, especially real estate and automobiles, requires much information and
complex imputation. Neither the EVS nor the GSOEP provides sufficient information for a sound imputation
and therefore this paper chooses to examine the nondurable consumption which is precise in both data sets.
17Including wage income, freelancing income, financial income, public and non-public transfer and real estate
leasing income.
18Dividing levels of education into: Pre-Primary Education, Primary Education or First Stage of Basic
Education, Lower Secondary or Secondary Stage of Basic Education, (Upper) Secondary Education, Post-
Secondary Non-Tertiary Education, First Stage of Tertiary Education, and Second Stage of Tertiary Education.
19Dividing occupations into: High Service, Low Service, Routine Non Manual, Self-Employed With Employ-
ees, Self-Employed No Employees, Manual Supervise, Skilled Manual, Semi - Unskilled Manual, Farm Labor,
Self-Employed Farm, Unemployed, and Pensioner.
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to label the job as of higher level if the index is less or equal to 8 (including high/low level
service, routine non-manual, self-employed, manual supervision, and skilled manual jobs),
otherwise it is considered as lower level
As is shown in Table 7, other household characteristics used to group the households
include household size, community size, and the age and nationality of household heads. The
division of household size, community size and age of household heads follow the same rule
to that of EVS. Regarding age particularly, suppose on average one person can work 40 years
(between 25 and 65 years old), then the first 10 years (25-35) would be the phase of trying
out and getting stabilized, and the last 10 years is the adjusting period before retirement,
and the middle 20 years is the most stable period in the sense of income and social status.
Therefore, I consider the household head to be young if she or he is under 35, middle aged
if between 35 and 55, and old if older than 55. Finally, the households can be “German”
or “Non-German” according to the nationality of the household head. Altogether, these
classifications divide the sample into 144 groups. Note that the criteria and classifications
used to group households are different from those in the data matching process because they
serve for different purposes.
The regression equation is similar to equation (14) and the main difference is how group
average consumption growth is calculated. Because the imputed data allows to calculate
per capita consumption growth directly, which avoids the missing link between the EVS
households over time, group average consumption growth is a mean of all group members’
consumption growth. Since the imputed data presents a nonlinear relationship between group
consumption growth and volatility, a quadratic term σ2i,t is added to the right hand side of the
regression equation. Moreover, what’re also included are relevant households characteristics,
according to which households are included in certain socio-economic groups and bear group-
specific preferences such as patience and attitude toward consumption benchmark in the
theoretical model.
gi,t = α0 + α1SDt (gi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σi,t
+ α2σ
2
i,t +X
′
i,tα3 + µi + δt + i,t (17)
where
gi,t =
1
J
∑
j
gij,t
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The data also allows to study the relationship between consumption growth and within-group
dispersion. The question is, do groups with average higher consumption growth rates also
see higher within-group differences? Again standard deviation and variance of consumption
growth within-group are included on the right-hand side to account for nonlinearity:
gi,t = α0 + α1∆t + α2∆
2
t +X
′
i,tα3 + µi + δt + i,t (18)
where
∆2t =
1
J
∑
j
(gij,t − gi,t)2 .
Table 10 summarizes the key variables and correlations for the imputed data. Group
mean growth rate, volatility and the unconditional correlations bear differences from those
in the EVS (Table 8). While the low group growth in EVS is due to the approximation
method aiming at constructing consumption growth by taking difference of the aggregated
consumption, the higher cross-sectional group average consumption growth rate and volatility
in the imputed data may result from both differences in household income (from GSOEP) and
the variation in consumption-income ratio (from EVS). Regarding durable consumption, the
unconditional correlations between growth and volatility and between growth and standard
deviation are shown as positive, while these correlations concerning nondurable consumption
are negative. These unconditional correlation, however, can not tell us much since many
important issues such as group specific effect and time effect are not considered yet.
Due to the panel structure of the imputed consumption, it’s possible to attain the direct
relationship between individual consumption growth and its volatility, which share a slightly
positive unconditional correlation of 0.02. For a more direct view, Figure 2 plots the consump-
tion growth against its volatility for the 144 groups in the imputed data set, which are defined
by household size, community size, age, education level, occupational background and nation-
ality of household heads. The unconditional correlation is captured by the slightly non-linear
curve, even though when outliers are excluded the fitted line is not any more upward-sloping.
A more sensible analysis would go beyond the rough unconditional correlation, and explore
the time structure and panel structure of the data.
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4 Estimation results
4.1 The most and least advantageous
The positive and significant link suggested by the regression results can be interpreted as the
welfare price the groups have to pay when they experience high group average consumption
growth. And what are these fast-growing groups? In another word, what would be the
important explanatory variables for per capita consumption growth? This question can be
answered by the following regression equation:
gij,t = α0 +X
′
ij,tα1 + ij,t (19)
with X denoting household specific control variables including community size, household
size, household heads’ age, nationality, education level, job type. The OLS regression using
the imputed data controlling for heteroskedacity shows that these household characteristics
associate similarly to the growth and volatility of nondurable and durable goods consump-
tion. As Table 9 shows, household size links negatively to the volatility of growth, indicating
that larger households turn to experience less volatility. This possibly results from better
insurance among the members in large households with more diverse income resources. The
age of household heads seem to relate significantly and slightly negatively to both growth
and volatility, implying slower growth and smaller volatility for older households. When
the household heads are non-German, the members turn to have slower growth and more
volatility, suggesting an inferior position of non-German households in welfare measure com-
paring to their German counterparts. As higher education and more skilled jobs appear to
have positive though insignificant link to growth, they are negatively associated to volatility,
suggesting possible insurance from income associated with higher education and more skilled
jobs. Community size seems to be irrelevant to household consumption growth and volatility.
More precisely, what are the groups with high consumption growth along with high volatil-
ity? Among all 144 groups in Figure 2, these are small foreign households with higher ed-
ucation and skilled jobs. It is surprising to see the groups at the weakest position from the
welfare perspective (low growth and high volatility) are households, be there foreign or native
German, with high education but unskilled jobs. Moreover, young, small families with higher
vocational education turn to have higher consumption growth.
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Figure 1 shows in more details the age effect of consumption growth inequality, where
income and consumption growth of the young, middle and old groups are compared. Just
as is shown in Figure 1, young households seem to have the highest and most volatile in-
come and consumption growth inequality, and old households the lowest and flattest growth
inequality over the years. Again, since a large part of the young population is still out of
the labor force and has limited income, consumption differences between them and young
professionals are big. However, once they start working, the sudden relaxation of their finan-
cial constraint boosts up their consumption to such a degree that the consumption growth
of the young groups is higher than the growth of the older groups. Different from the level
case where income variance dominates consumption variance, sometimes consumption growth
presents a higher variance than income growth, especially from end 1980s until middle 1990s.
Middle-aged and old households appear to have a much lower income and consumption growth
variance than the younger ones, whereas it is almost always the case that their consumption
growth variance surpasses their income growth variance. This is also the case for old house-
holds. This may reflect the different saving habits of households when they are young, or
different credit constraints for older households which are based on their existing wealth and
credit history.
4.2 EVS
The upper panels of Table 11, 12 and 13 present cross-sectional fixed effect estimations of
group nondurable consumption growth on volatility (equation (14) and (17)) for nondurable,
durable and total consumption respectively. The estimators are cluster robust. To exclude the
effect of household size, per capita consumption growth is the key variable in both the current
and next section, where OECD defined equivalent scale is employed. Group fixed effects are
considered for all regressions and one extreme outlier is excluded. Column (1) is the result
of a cross-sectional regression of group consumption growth on the volatility. The lagged
group consumption is added in (2) and (3), while time dummies are included in (3). Neither
of durable, nondurable or total consumption sees significant relation between consumption
growth and volatility, and the signs of the estimated coefficient concerning volatility is also
mixed.
The data also allows for studying the welfare effect of consumption growth. The key
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question lies on the evolution of the within-group standard deviation along with the group
average growth, as are summarized by equation (15) and (18). Regression results are sum-
marized in the lower panels of Table 11-13. The relationship between growth and inequality
is positive but insignificant for nondurable consumption, while durable consumption growth
seems to negatively relate to the within-group inequality. It implies that groups with higher
durable goods consumption also appear to be more equal. In the “keeping up with the Jone-
ses” context and especially regarding the conventional hypothesis on positional goods, this
makes sense because groups with high durable consumption growth might be those signaling
strongly with the purchase of the positional goods, where the average will to keep up with
others is also stark. The growth-inequality relationship turns to the opposite when it comes
to total consumption. Also significant, it seems that groups with high total consumption
growth also observe within-group inequality. This result is not controversial to the previous
one because the high-growing groups here are not the same as in the durable consumption
case. They can be more described as young, small households who are at their start of career
and subject to more diverse income and other shocks. Nondurable consumption grows fast
while durables still pick up slowly due to their budget constraint. The positive regression
results thus reflect the dominant nondurable share in total consumption.
4.3 The Imputed Consumption
Figure 2 and 3 vaguely display nonlinear growth-volatility associations for durable and non-
durable consumption with 95% confidence interval. The U-shaped relationships for non-
durable and total consumption (negative coefficient for standard deviation and positive coef-
ficient for its square) are confirmed in cross-sectional fixed effect regressions (Table 14 and 16).
Similar to the regressions for EVS consumption, group fixed effect and time effect are consid-
ered, whereas lagged consumption and time effect are gradually added to the right hand side
of the equation. Perhaps due to the unrepresentative information on durable consumption,
there is no significant growth-volatility relation reported.
Let’s focus on the nondurable and total consumption. For groups with consumption
growth under a threshold growth rate g¯, the growth is accompanied by diminishing volatil-
ity; above g¯, faster growing groups witness higher volatility. This threshold growth rate can
be calculated using the estimates of the coefficients (− α̂12α̂2 ). Recall the results presented in
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Table 9. Those groups with high nondurable consumption growth and high volatility are the
young households, who are mapped at the upper right area in Figure 2. Those with relatively
low growth and medium volatility are the older and / or foreign head households, located
at the middle of the fitted line. A large number of groups gather at the left end of Figure
2. These dominant medium growth, low volatility households may be described as, among
others, older aged, large in number, well educated and with skilled jobs. Nonetheless, as is
mentioned before, the interpretation of the imputed data should be very careful due to the
over/under-estimation problem of the volatility. In the process of matching, the underestima-
tion of personal shocks θij may differ in group consumption level and is possibly particularly
serious in the lower end of the distribution (assuming poorer households usually have higher
consumption volatility due to tighter credit constraint). Consequently, the the difference
in growth-volatility relationships for households with faster and slower consumption growth
may partly result from the data imputation process.
Similar to the nondurable growth-volatility distribution, a large number of the groups
are accumulated at the left end where both nondurable consumption growth and inequality
are low (Figure 4). The distribution of durable consumption inequality is more dispersed,
with the concentration of the groups spanning wider than the nondurable case. The lower
panels of Table 14-16 report the regression results of group growth on within-group inequality,
where the U-shaped relationship also holds but is only significant for nondurable consumption.
Groups with very low inequality can be those at older age and with stable occupation, who are
rather subject to similar income and preference shocks. Such stability consequently allows
for decent consumption growth. At the other end, highly unequal groups are subject to
remarkably varied idiosyncratic shocks, where the high group growth rate could be a result
of those households with extremely large positive shocks.
5 Summary
This paper explores the link between household consumption growth and volatility from
both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Heterogeneous households transfer resources
intertemporally via trading one type of asset, which helps to store value and insure against
income shocks. Different from typical neoclassical models, households incorporate group
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average consumption as reference, so that the relative standard of living becomes relevant
besides the absolute level. The degree of (im)patience is another important group-specific
parameter influencing households’ decision on security holding against current consumption.
The incomplete market setup, among other traits, offers partial insurance against income
shocks and contributes to consumption smoothing. Still, the general model equilibrium pre-
dicts a positive link between consumption growth and volatility, implying unstable growth
over time. Moreover, consumption dynamics vary among households with different prefer-
ences, especially when group average consumption serves as external benchmark. While more
patient groups experience smaller volatility, household eagerness to keep up with group mean
intensifies the volatility of the whole group. In a business cycle context, dominant positive
income shocks and preference on consumption smoothing drive up the security price, and
further strengthens the power of household preferences.
I further use German data to construct household consumption growth in order to test the
hypothesis on the positive link between growth and volatility of durable, nondurable and total
consumption. A look at individual level consumption growth, volatility and the households’
characteristics helps to identify the controls with important economic impacts. Household
size, the age and nationality of household heads are relevant to growth and volatility, whereas
heads’ education does not seem important. Community size and heads’ job profiles are
positively associated with consumption volatility. The most unfavorable households in the
imputed data are those have high education but unskilled jobs, whose low growth and high
volatility may come from low income and frequent change of jobs. Households with foreign
heads also often find themselves in the category of low consumption growth and high volatility.
As EVS can not provide significant evidence on the link, the imputed data reveals a U-
shaped relationship in nondurable consumption growth and volatility. At the right end are
those young households who experience both high growth and high volatility, at the left end
are the households at older age, large in number, well educated and / or with skilled jobs,
whereas those with relatively low growth and medium volatility are the older and / or foreign
head households. From another perspective of welfare cost, also in the EVS, the link between
group growth and within-group inequality is found positive for nondurable consumption but
negative for the durables. The results suggest that lower income households, mostly young
and small-sized, are experiencing higher growth in nondurable consumption and subject to
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more diverse shocks; higher income households with faster growing purchase of positional
goods are more identical in the case of durable consumption.
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6 Appendix I: Taylor approximation of the group average Eu-
ler equation
According to second order Taylor approximation,
lnGi,t+1 ≈ lnGi + 1
Gi
(Gi,t+1 −Gi)− 1
2G2i
(Gi,t+1 −Gi)2
Since EGi,t+1 = Gi, taking unconditional mean of both sides yields
E lnGi,t+1 = lnEGi,t+1 +
1
Gi
E (Gi,t+1 −Gi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
− 1
2G2i
E (Gi,t+1 −Gi)2 .
Rearrange it, we have
lnEGi,t+1 = E lnGi,t+1 +
1
2
E
[(
Gi,t+1 −Gi
Gi
)2]
(20)
or, E [Gi,t+1] ≈ exp
{
E lnGi,t+1 +
1
2
E
[(
Gi,t+1 −Gi
Gi
)2]}
.
Similarly according to Taylor approximation,
G
(−γ−(1−γ)κi)
i,t+1 ≈ G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i + (−γ − (1− γ)κi)G(−γ−(1−γ)κi−1)i (Gi,t+1 −Gi)
+
(−γ − (1− γ)κi) (−γ − (1− γ)κi − 1)
2
G
(−γ−(1−γ)κi−2)
i (Gi,t+1 −Gi)2
and
EG
(−γ−(1−γ)κi)
i,t+1 ≈ G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i + (−γ − (1− γ)κi)G(−γ−(1−γ)κi−1)i E (Gi,t+1 −Gi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+
(−γ − (1− γ)κi) (−γ − (1− γ)κi − 1)
2
G
(−γ−(1−γ)κi−2)
i E (Gi,t+1 −Gi)2
EG
(−γ−(1−γ)κi)
i,t+1 ≈ G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i
[
1 +
(−γ − (1− γ)κi) (−γ − (1− γ)κi − 1)
2
E
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Gi,t+1 −Gi
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)2]
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Taking log of both sides yields
lnEG
(−γ−(1−γ)κi)
i,t+1 ≈ lnG(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i
+ ln
[
1 +
(−γ − (1− γ)κi) (−γ − (1− γ)κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 −Gi
Gi
)2]
.
Since E
(
Gi,t+1−Gi
Gi
)2
is very small,
ln
[
1 +
(−γ − (1− γ)κi) (−γ − (1− γ)κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 −Gi
Gi
)2]
≈ (−γ − (1− γ)κi) (−γ − (1− γ)κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 −Gi
Gi
)2
.
Using the result from (20),
lnEG
(−γ−(1−γ)κi)
i,t+1 ≈ (−γ − (1− γ)κi)
[
E lnGi,t+1 +
1
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 −Gi
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)2]
+
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2
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(
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)2
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2
2
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where E lnGi,t+1 = E ln (1 + gi,t+1) ≈ Egi,t+1 = gi, and
E
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Figure 1: Income and Consumption Growth Inequality, At Different Age
Figure 2: Group Consumption Growth and Volatility, Imputed Data
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Figure 3: Group Consumption Growth and Volatility, Imputed Data
Figure 4: Group Consumption Growth and Inequality, Imputed Data
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Table 1. Methodological Characteristics of Household Income Surveys in EVS and GSOEP
EVS SOEP
Survey repeated cross-section panel
Sampling method quota sample based on the
mandatory random Micro Cen-
sus
stratified random sample
Sample size 1998: app. 60,000 households 1984-2000: app. 6,000 households;
since 2001: app. 12,000 households
Collection of income
data
continuous bookkeeping by the
participants
monthly (net) household income;
major gross income components in
the interview month; retrospective
income data for the previous year
Foreign household head Coverage since 1993 explicit over-sampling
Coverage of upper and
lower end
no homeless; non-coverage of
households with monthly net in-
come over 35,000 DM (1998)
no homeless; starting 2002 SOEP
includes an additional sample of the
very rich
Tax and social security
contribution
payments during the response
period included in survey, but
no allowance for final tax assess-
ment
imputation based on basic tax rou-
tines and flat deduction for employ-
ees, provisional lump sums, tax ex-
emptions for capital income, and
child allowances
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Table 2. Comparison of GSOEP and EVS Consumption by Year (1995 price=100)
1988 1993 1998 2003
SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS
Net Income 24114 33569 25745 36057 24395 38568 26240 38724
(22642) (31693) (24213) (33229) (22986) (35314) (24179) (35379)
Non. consumption 11898 14695 12572 15149 12351 15878 13446 16281
(11688) (14388) (12551) (14743) (12323) (15467) (13546) (16042)
(Original EVS) - 14721 - 15184 - 15895 - 16292
- (13851) - (14000) - (14545) - (14929)
Dur. consumption 4212 5596 4614 6000 3584 5024 3376 4475
(4202) (5665) (4605) (5895) (3657) (4993) (3356) (4394)
(Original EVS) - 5616 - 6022 - 5061 - 4518
- (3580) - (4017) - (2609) - (2590)
Tot. consumption 20459 25498 21791 26620 22224 28829 22971 28282
(20129) (25062) (21594) (25851) (22269) (28079) (22920) (27607)
(Original EVS) - 25540 - 26663 - 28968 - 28407
- (23813) - (24535) - (26005) - (25643)
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Comparison of GSOEP and EVS Demographics by Year
1988 1993 1998 2003
SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS
Household size 2.710 2.696 2.630 2.601 2.519 2.597 2.407 2.441
Age of hh head 48.159 48.369 48.488 48.347 48.999 48.209 51.966 50.080
Male head 75.5% 72.4% 71.3% 68.1% 66.2% 67.5% 64.0% 64.4%
Female head 24.5% 27.6% 28.7% 31.9% 33.8% 32.5% 36.0% 35.6%
Berlin west 3.9% 4.0% 3.6% 3.3% 3.4% 2.3% 3.1% 0.6%
Schl.-Holstein 3.4% 5.0% 3.3% 5.7% 3.3% 5.1% 3.8% 5.0%
Hamburg 2.5% 2.9% 1.9% 3.2% 1.8% 3.2% 2.0% 2.9%
Niedersachsen 10.3% 9.9% 10.7% 9.5% 11.5% 10.2% 11.2% 9.5%
Bremen 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.1% 1.5%
Nord.-Westfalen 27.0% 27.5% 27.0% 30.0% 27.0% 27.2% 28.3% 27.3%
Hessen 9.8% 8.8% 9.9% 8.6% 9.2% 8.5% 8.5% 9.9%
Rhein.-Pfalz 7.1% 7.9% 6.9% 8.3% 7.7% 7.7% 8.4% 8.0%
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 18.2% 14.5% 17.8% 13.9% 16.9% 15.4% 15.4% 15.7%
Bayern 16.7% 18.3% 17.5% 16.2% 18.0% 18.8% 18.2% 19.6%
Below 20,000 pop. 34.8% 40.2% 34.6% 38.6% 38.4% 40.3% 38.8% 42.3%
20,000-100,000 27.3% 25.9% 27.4% 25.7% 27.1% 25.4% 28.1% 26.0%
Over 1000,000 38.0% 34.0% 37.9% 35.7% 34.5% 34.3% 33.1% 31.7%
Sing. women 13.4% 13.3% 14.1% 15.3% 15.2% 14.1% 16.1% 15.7%
Sing. men 9.1% 6.3% 9.3% 8.9% 9.4% 8.3% 11.1% 9.2%
Sing. par+1 kid 3.5% 2.6% 3.5% 2.8% 3.6% 2.8% 3.8% 3.0%
Sing. par+more kids 2.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 1.8%
Couple no kid 24.4% 26.0% 26.4% 28.5% 28.9% 29.8% 31.2% 33.6%
Couple+1 kid 17.5% 18.5% 17.7% 15.3% 16.1% 13.1% 13.7% 11.9%
Couple+more kids 25.8% 26.7% 22.8% 25.1% 21.2% 25.6% 19.9% 21.1%
Others 4.2% 5.3% 4.8% 2.7% 3.5% 4.1% 2.1% 3.7%
Farmer 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.0% 0.4%
Self-employed 6.0% 1.6% 6.3% 2.5% 2.1% 2.6% 0.5% 2.6%
Civil servant 6.4% 16.8% 6.1% 16.3% 5.6% 14.0% 5.6% 11.3%
Employed 22.4% 36.4% 20.3% 35.7% 24.1% 42.7% 26.7% 41.1%
Worker 32.4% 15.7% 29.9% 14.8% 24.3% 11.8% 20.4% 11.9%
Unempl./inactive 32.0% 28.9% 36.8% 30.2% 43.5% 28.3% 46.8% 32.6%
Sample size 4793 43803 4419 31497 5123 39060 7310 33818
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Table 4. Data matching
Matching
Criteria
Community
Size
Federal
States
Age of
Household
Head
Occupation of
Household Head
Household Type Survey
Years
Nr of Cat-
egories
3 10 6 6 8 5
Definition 1 if less
than 20000
residents,
2 if be-
tween
20000-
100000
residents,
3 if more
than
100000
residents
All old
federal
states
incl.
West
Berlin
1 if no older
than 25, 2
if between
25-35, 3
if between
35-45, 4
if between
45-55, 5
if between
55-65, and
6 if older
than 65
1 if self-
employed
farmer, 2 if
other self-
employed, 3 if
civil servants,
4 if dependent
employee, 5 if
worker and 6 if
unemployed or
not inactive
1 if single women,
2 if single men,
3 if single parent
with 1 child, 4
if single parent
with 2 or more
children, 5 if pair
with no child,
6 if pair with 1
child, 7 if pair
with 2 or more
children and 8 if
others, including
multi-generation
households
1983,
1988,
1993,
1998,
2003
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Table 5. Consumption / income ratios over the years
Year Mean
(Cnd)
Std. Dev.
(Cnd)
Mean
(Cd)
Std. Dev.
(Cd)
Mean
(Ct)
Std. Dev.
(Ct)
Nr. of
Obs
1985 0.492 0.086 0.162 0.059 0.820 0.121 3773
1986 0.486 0.079 0.163 0.058 0.817 0.114 3441
1987 0.481 0.082 0.164 0.068 0.817 0.128 3425
1988 0.476 0.096 0.164 0.078 0.817 0.147 3372
1989 0.474 0.085 0.167 0.065 0.816 0.132 3666
1990 0.473 0.085 0.169 0.064 0.817 0.134 3439
1991 0.474 0.084 0.169 0.062 0.817 0.129 3439
1992 0.471 0.083 0.171 0.064 0.816 0.126 3218
1993 0.471 0.097 0.174 0.084 0.820 0.154 3359
1994 0.471 0.091 0.171 0.084 0.829 0.150 3125
1995 0.470 0.090 0.165 0.073 0.834 0.144 3374
1996 0.473 0.097 0.160 0.086 0.847 0.158 3426
1997 0.476 0.109 0.156 0.096 0.860 0.185 3399
1998 0.473 0.109 0.151 0.114 0.864 0.183 3305
1999 0.478 0.100 0.148 0.095 0.866 0.176 3465
2000 0.478 0.087 0.147 0.091 0.860 0.158 3415
2001 0.483 0.097 0.140 0.078 0.858 0.159 5549
2002 0.484 0.111 0.137 0.085 0.853 0.176 5512
2003 0.485 0.089 0.134 0.091 0.845 0.154 5906
Total 0.482 0.104 0.499 0.108 102931
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Figure 5: Group Consumption Growth and Inequality, Imputed Data
Table 6. EVS Grouping Criteria
EVS
Grouping Cri-
teria
Community
Size
Household
Size
Age of House-
hold Head
Gender of
Household
Head
Occupation of
Household Head
Nr of Cate-
gories
3 2 3 2 6
Definition 1 if less
than 20000
residents, 2
if between
20000-100000
residents,
3 if more
than 100000
residents
1 if fewer than
3, 2 if 3 or
more than 3
1 if no older
than 35, 2
if between
35-55, 3 if
older than 55
1 if male, 2 if
female
1 if self-employed
farmer, 2 if other
self-employed, 3 if
civil servants, 4 if
dependent employee,
5 if worker, 6 if
unemployed or not
inactive
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Table 7. Imputed Data Grouping Criteria
Matched sample
Grouping Cri-
teria
Community
Size
Household
Size
Age of
Household
Head
Education
of House-
hold Head
Occupation
of Household
Head
Nationality
of House-
hold Head
Nr of Cate-
gories
3 2 3 2 2 2
Definition 1 if less
than 20000
residents, 2
if between
20000-
100000
residents,
3 if more
than 100000
residents
1 if fewer
than 3, 2 if
3 or more
than 3
1 if no
older than
35, 2 if
between
35-55, 3 if
older than
55
1 if one
has at
least post-
secondary
non-
tertiary
education
(higher ed-
ucated), 2
if otherwise
1 if more skilled
(high/low level
service, routine
non-manual,
self-employed,
manual su-
pervision, and
skilled man-
ual jobs), 2 if
otherwise
1 if German
native, 2 if
not
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Table 8. EVS: Summary Statistics of Per Capita Consumption
Mean Median Min Max Frequency
Nondurable consumption
gi 0.87% 0.74% -0.98 1.05 200
σi 0.13 0.09 0 0.62 200
∆i 0.011 0.008 -0.22 0.42 200
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.09
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.31
Durable consumption
gi -0.093% -0.062% -2.589 1.531 200
σi 0.474 0.317 0 2.959 200
∆i 0.003 0 -0.832 0.386 200
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.19
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.03
Total consumption
gi 0.023% 0.017% -0.714 0.955 200
σi 0.137 0.095 0 0.62 200
∆i 0.005 0.005 -0.234 0.312 200
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.12
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.14
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Table 9. Imputed Data: Nondurable v.s. durable consumption growth and volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nond. Cons Growth Volatility Durab. Cons Growth Volatility
Community
size
0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.59) (-1.41) (1.00) (0.87)
Household size 0.002* -0.002** 0.000 -0.007***
(1.71) (-2.41) (0.01) (-3.25)
Age of hh head -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003***
(-4.75) (-6.83) (-4.47) (-12.51)
Non German -0.011*** 0.010** -0.014** 0.032***
(-3.14) (2.56) (-2.38) (3.39)
Higher educa-
tion
0.005* -0.002 0.007 -0.003
(1.73) (-0.69) (1.50) (-0.49)
Skilled jobs 0.004 -0.015*** 0.009* -0.042***
(1.48) (-4.99) (1.89) (-5.90)
Constant 0.013 0.119*** 0.000 0.326***
(1.46) (10.20) (0.01) (13.42)
Observations 10842 10842 10841 10841
r2 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.026
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions use imputed data, where consumption is adjusted with equivalent scale.
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Table 10. Imputed Data: Summary Statistics of Per Capita Consumption
Mean Median Min Max Nr. of HHs
Nondurable consumption
gij 0.98% 1.11% -2.19 2.96 11062
σij 0.17 0.14 0 2.25 11062
Correlation(gij , σij) = 0.008
gi 0.01 0.012 -0.134 0.165 144
σi 0.116 0.086 0.021 0.490 144
∆i 0.242 0.241 0.003 0.566 144
Correlation(gi, σi) = 0.09
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.07
Durable consumption
gij -0.51% -0.38% -3.52 4.22 11061
σij 0.248 0.194 0 2.88 11062
Correlation(gij , σij) = 0.009
gi -0.014 -0.017 -0.375 0.25 144
σi 0.202 0.140 0.034 1.00 144
∆i 0.385 0.392 0.032 0.809 144
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.06
Correlation(gi,∆i) = −0.11
Total consumption
gij 1.04% 1.13% -2.19 2.9 11062
σij 0.169 0.143 0 2.25 11062
Correlation(gij , σij) = 0.015
gi 0.013 0.012 -0.112 0.186 144
σi 0.116 0.085 0.013 0.538 144
∆i 0.241 0.236 0.01 0.56 144
Correlation(gi, σi) = 0.15
Correlation(gi,∆i) = −0.02
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Table 11. EVS: Nond. Consumption Growth on Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σnd -0.072 0.099 0.106
(-0.65) (1.24) (1.48)
Lag nond. consumption -1.180*** -1.211***
(-21.09) (-20.65)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.013 10.691*** 10.993***
(1.07) (21.27) (20.76)
Observations 935 935 935
F 0.421 287.443 140.395
r2within 0.002 0.576 0.628
r2between 0.009 0.006 0.007
r2overall 0.003 0.091 0.103
Inequality
∆nd 0.061 0.079 0.101
(0.48) (1.22) (1.64)
Lag nond. consumption -1.170*** -1.205***
(-22.52) (-21.13)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.004*** 10.614*** 10.948***
(2.79) (22.53) (21.13)
Observations 935 935 935
F 0.234 253.687 135.238
r2within 0.001 0.575 0.628
r2between 0.096 0.007 0.008
r2overall 0.004 0.094 0.106
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is gi,t, and the time period is from 1984-2003. (1) is the result of a cross-sectional
regression of group nondurable consumption growth on its volatility. The lagged group nondurable
consumption is added in (2) and (3), while time dummies are included in (3).
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Table 12. EVS: Durable Consumption Growth on Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σd 0.229 -0.087 -0.155*
(0.57) (-1.07) (-1.73)
Lag dur. consumption -1.324*** -1.389***
(-10.85) (-10.24)
Time effect significant***
Constant -0.162 9.999*** 10.216***
(-1.05) (10.86) (10.13)
Observations 935 935 935
F 0.324 62.920 185.051
r2within 0.011 0.660 0.742
r2between 0.041 0.102 0.124
r2overall 0.000 0.333 0.383
Inequality
∆d -0.545*** -0.183*** -0.106**
(-7.54) (-3.37) (-2.23)
Lag dur. consumption -1.272*** -1.336***
(-9.63) (-11.04)
Time effect significant***
Constant -0.068*** 9.575*** 9.771***
(-85.18) (9.56) (10.98)
Observations 935 935 935
F 56.864 170.629 223.625
r2within 0.088 0.668 0.741
r2between 0.001 0.086 0.098
r2overall 0.081 0.339 0.376
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is gi,t, and the time period is from 1984-2003. (1) is the result of a cross-sectional
regression of group durable consumption growth on its volatility. The lagged group durable consumption is
added in (2) and (3), while time dummies are included in (3).
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Table 13. EVS: Total Consumption Growth on Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σt -0.234 0.041 0.109
(-1.04) (0.36) (1.04)
Lag total cons. -0.986*** -1.159***
(-18.67) (-22.53)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.046*** 9.490*** 11.210***
(3.53) (18.82) (22.73)
Observations 935 935 935
F 4.178 186.012 182.866
r2within 0.014 0.491 0.622
r2between 0.017 0.002 0.002
r2overall 0.011 0.099 0.118
Inequality
∆t 0.348** 0.177** 0.158**
(2.60) (2.17) (2.13)
Lag total cons. -0.961*** -1.121***
(-17.74) (-22.08)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.017*** 9.251*** 10.853***
(16.73) (17.76) (22.06)
Observations 935 935 935
F 6.746 186.423 194.739
r2within 0.038 0.501 0.627
r2between 0.020 0.002 0.003
r2overall 0.034 0.108 0.128
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is gi,t, and the time period is from 1984-2003. (1) is the result of a cross-sectional
regression of group total consumption growth on its volatility. The lagged group total consumption is added
in (2) and (3), while time dummies are included in (3).
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Table 14. Imputed Data: Nondurable Consumption Growth on Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σnd -0.366*** -0.349*** -0.331***
(-4.93) (-4.32) (-4.08)
σ2nd 0.815*** 0.764*** 0.757***
(5.13) (4.60) (4.54)
Lag nond. consumption -0.182*** -0.194***
(-6.56) (-6.55)
Time effect significant**
(2.49)
Constant 0.026*** 1.633*** 1.716***
(6.25) (6.67) (6.56)
Observations 2567 2423 2423
F 14.113 27.840 8.586
r2within 0.063 0.110 0.130
r2between 0.074 0.001 0.000
r2overall 0.064 0.055 0.068
Inequality
∆nd -0.217*** -0.240*** -0.237***
(-3.91) (-4.03) (-3.86)
∆2nd 0.300*** 0.311*** 0.317***
(3.64) (3.83) (3.82)
Lag nond. consumption -0.162*** -0.175***
(-6.95) (-7.22)
Time effect significant**
Constant 0.040*** 1.478*** 1.578***
(4.40) (7.13) (7.40)
Observations 2346 2226 2226
F 7.839 19.941 8.322
r2within 0.017 0.065 0.096
r2between 0.001 0.016 0.011
r2overall 0.014 0.016 0.031
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Group nondurable consumption growth rate is the dependent variable.
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Table 15. Imputed Data: Durable Consumption Growth on Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σd 0.094 0.068 0.088
(0.54) (0.37) (0.49)
σ2d -0.190 -0.168 -0.172
(-0.93) (-0.80) (-0.84)
Lag dur. consumption -0.104*** -0.115***
(-3.96) (-3.90)
Time effect significant**
(2.49)
Constant -0.015 0.784*** 0.912***
(-1.07) (3.82) (4.04)
Observations 2567 2423 2423
F 0.892 6.262 8.261
r2within 0.025 0.039 0.081
r2between 0.006 0.241 0.250
r2overall 0.020 0.010 0.039
Inequality
∆d 0.108 0.112 0.140
(0.59) (0.61) (0.77)
∆2d -0.240 -0.245 -0.247
(-1.31) (-1.34) (-1.35)
Lag dur. consumption -0.089*** -0.091***
(-4.15) (-3.86)
Time effect significant**
Constant -0.011 0.674*** 0.727***
(-0.30) (3.98) (4.00)
Observations 2345 2225 2225
F 6.478 10.575 9.804
r2within 0.051 0.067 0.113
r2between 0.043 0.050 0.053
r2overall 0.047 0.027 0.063
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Group durable consumption growth rate is the dependent variable.
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Table 16. Imputed Data: Total Consumption Growth on Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σ -0.378*** -0.362*** -0.349***
(-5.07) (-4.93) (-4.73)
σ2 0.765*** 0.751*** 0.749***
(4.61) (4.76) (4.74)
Lag total cons. -0.198*** -0.215***
(-7.03) (-6.58)
Time effect significant**
(2.49)
Constant 0.031*** 1.887*** 2.021***
(6.70) (7.16) (6.61)
Observations 2567 2423 2423
F 13.901 38.348 11.649
r2within 0.074 0.136 0.150
r2between 0.096 0.014 0.011
r2overall 0.074 0.065 0.072
Inequality
∆ -0.070 -0.096 -0.092
(-1.12) (-1.46) (-1.41)
∆2 0.156 0.177* 0.179*
(1.48) (1.70) (1.73)
Lag total cons. -0.159*** -0.174***
(-6.53) (-6.35)
Time effect significant**
Constant 0.017* 1.521*** 1.652***
(1.84) (6.60) (6.44)
Observations 2346 2226 2226
F 1.167 14.431 4.828
r2within 0.008 0.056 0.076
r2between 0.000 0.028 0.028
r2overall 0.008 0.009 0.016
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Group total consumption growth rate is the dependent variable.
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